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Abstract
This paper provides three interrelated reasons not to confound 
perceptions of economic group-threat with hostility toward people of 
foreign origin. Firstly, I argue that expansive notions of prejudice impede 
analyzing attitudes toward immigration and immigrants with sufficient 
precision. Secondly, the recent evolution in the Southern Spanish region 
of Andalusia illustrates divergent trajectories: anti-immigrant sentiment 
remained subdued despite surging unemployment and perceived 
conflict-of-interest. Thirdly, various factors are found to contain anti-
immigrant sentiment amidst inauspicious economic circumstances and 
regardless of perceived group-competition. The study shows that 
attitudes towards immigrants hinge on a complex array of predispositions 
and perceptions, rather than economic facts and interests per se. 
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Resumen
Este artículo proporciona tres razones conexas por las que percepciones 
de competencia grupal no deben confundirse con hostilidad hacia las 
personas de procedencia extranjera. Primero, se argumenta que 
concepciones expansivas del prejuicio acaban desdibujando el análisis 
de las actitudes en materia migratoria. Segundo, se observan trayectorias 
dispares de competencia grupal percibida, por un lado, y animosidad 
antinmigrante, por otro. Tercero, se identifican varios factores que 
disminuyen el sentimiento antinmigrante, pese a circunstancias 
económicas desalentadoras y al margen de competencia grupal 
percibida. El estudio demuestra que las actitudes hacia el colectivo 
inmigrante no dependen sin más de hechos e intereses económicos, sino 
de un complejo entramado de predisposiciones y percepciones.
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IntroductIon
Throughout the past two decades Europe’s 
Mediterranean periphery has attracted mas-
sive inflows of labour migrants; however, 
from 2008 onwards the region was hit by a 
severe economic crisis. The boom-bust cy-
cle of the Spanish labour market epitomises 
this challenging sequence; the unemploy-
ment rate surged beyond 35% in less-fa-
voured areas such as Andalusia. How would 
native citizens react to this situation? Em-
pirical and conceptual antecedents suggest 
that there is a risk of a backlash effect when 
immigration societies experience economic 
downturns. But such predictions have prov-
en inaccurate to date in Spain, and specifi-
cally in Andalusia: although the mood con-
cerning labour immigration soured, no wave 
of anti-immigrant sentiment arose. 
By dwelling on this riddle, this paper aims 
to refine the conceptualisation of intergroup 
relations in an inauspicious context. After re-
viewing extant scholarship and time-trends 
involving different attitude facets, nine ex-
planatory hypotheses concerning hostility-
containment are tested with a logistic regres-
sion model, using data collected in the crisis’ 
sixth year (N=2,363). Two groups of predic-
tors were distinguished: general predisposi-
tions that entail encompassing conceptions 
of group membership, and situational per-
ceptions that reassure natives about their 
relative group-status. Three benevolent pre-
dispositions (leftist ideology, close contact, 
and Universalism) and three situational fac-
tors (re-emigration expectations, citizenship 
boundaries, and elite-blaming) were found to 
improve sentiment towards immigrants re-
gardless of immigration’s perceived impact 
on the labour-market. 
The competitive logic that underpins 
group-status perceptions is categorically dif-
ferent from principled immigration-friendly 
dispositions; such latent tension may even-
tually surface. Yet, this study shows that 
even in ominous labour-market conditions, 
natives’ attitudes toward allochthonous peo-
ple hinge on both: sentiment toward immi-
grants is determined by a complex array of 
general dispositions and situational assess-
ments, rather than by macro-economic con-
text and perceived conflict-of-interest per se. 
Based on nuanced conceptualisation and 
measurement, this study challenges expan-
sive notions of prejudice and simplistic ver-
sions of group-threat theory – two common 
features of extant scholarship1.
conceptualIsatIon and 
measurement: a crItIcal 
appraIsal
As Ceobanu and Escandell (2010: 311-313) 
noted, many scholars tend to conflate the 
measurement of reactions to international 
migration as such (“attitudes towards immi-
gration’), on the one hand, and views regard-
ing people of foreign origin (“attitudes toward 
immigrants”), on the other, in a way that 
“poses potentially serious consequences for 
the validity and value of such research”. Sur-
vey items are often merged into indices with-
out considering the possibility that “attitudes 
towards immigration may follow dynamics 
very different from those of attitudes towards 
immigrants”. The reigning “terminological 
ambiguity” is aggravated by the fact that at-
titudes towards immigrants are, more often 
than not, studied in terms of ethnic and racial 
prejudice, even though “not all immigrant-
related attitudes have an explicit ethno-racial 
component”.
Far from regarding merely technical is-
sues, and beyond the want of datasets that 
1 Survey data used in this study were generated by the 
Institute for Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC) on 
behalf of Andalusia’s Migration Observatory (OPAM). 
Pilar Cortés-Sánchez and Manuel Trujillo lent invaluable 
statistical support. Anonymous REIS reviewers, members 
of IMISCOE’s Research Cluster on Southern Europe, and 
Dirk Godenau (ULL) contributed helpful comments on 
earlier drafts.
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would allow for more nuanced operationali-
sations, these admonitions concern two 
widely-accepted conceptual premises of re-
search on attitudes toward immigration and 
immigrants (hereinafter, ATII), namely: 
1) The idea that any unfavourable view 
in this domain is essentially equivalent to 
anti-immigrant prejudice, and 
2) The idea that attitudes towards im-
migrants are essentially synonymous with 
attitudes regarding ethnic and racial diver-
sity.   
These notions have taken hold in the re-
search community, partly due to the difficulty 
in discerning legitimate qualms from ration-
alisations of prejudice, and partly to con-
cerns about desirability-bias. “If lack of justi-
fication is used to define prejudice, who is to 
decide which justifications are legitimate and 
which are not?” (Esses et al., 1998: 720). On 
such grounds, in addition to the traditional 
focus on negative emotions (Allport, 1954: 9), 
any unfavourable views, including percep-
tions of intergroup competition, might be in-
terpreted as a form of prejudice. Especially 
concerning the explanandum of multivariate 
models, such equations are common in oth-
erwise sophisticated studies (see Riek et al., 
2006: 341). “Implicit in most theoretical mod-
els about attitudes toward immigration is the 
idea that anti-immigration attitudes are a 
form of prejudice” (Wilkes et al., 2008: 303). 
As for desirability-bias, restraints against 
overt hostility are presumed to reflect aware-
ness that prejudice is morally unacceptable. 
The quest for indirect, or subtle, indicators of 
animosity (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995) 
has fuelled the acceptance of expansive no-
tions of prejudice. 
The same predictors are commonly em-
ployed with regard to both racist and anti-
immigrant prejudice (e.g. Quillian, 1995), and 
intergroup attitudes are often studied in ways 
that equate “anti-immigrant sentiment” with 
“hostile ethnic stances” (e.g. Schlueter and 
Davidov, 2013). According to Cea-D’Ancona, 
“the measurement of xenophobia improves 
when migration policy indicators are used” 
(2014: 258). To some extent, such approach-
es reflect an empirical reality: many coun-
tries’ ethnic diversification originates from 
international migration. However, these con-
ceptual mergers ignore the equally important 
fact that race relations and international mi-
gration generate different kinds of group 
conflicts. Whereas racial or ethnic discrimi-
nation is inherently inadmissible, the govern-
ance of citizenship in a globalised world le-
gitimately entails, perhaps even requires, a 
differentiation of rights according to national-
ity and immigration status (Sainsbury, 2006; 
Soysal, 1994). Regarding this contentious 
matter, it seems inappropriate to posit unre-
stricted access to civic, social, and political 
rights as the only ethically acceptable stance. 
Yet, that position follows logically when “un-
favourable ATII” and “xenophobia” are treat-
ed as synonyms.
The resulting confusion indeed stifles the 
validity and value of research. If qualms con-
cerning immigration-related matters, as 
such, pass for evidence of gratuitous hostil-
ity, it becomes impossible to analyse the re-
lationship between both aspects. And if any 
misgivings are de-legitimised as racist deni-
gration, a meaningful debate on migration 
management becomes unviable. The intent 
of gauging the diffusion—net of response 
bias—of xenophobic and racist mindsets 
should not entail interpreting any sceptical 
assessment of international migration as in-
trinsically illegitimate hostility. Such concep-
tual fuzziness is detrimental to the aim of 
furthering knowledge on the social condi-
tions in which “prejudiced personalities will 
be more numerous” than at other times and 
places (Allport, 1954: 221).
Allport’s list of prejudice-spurning context 
included a large or growing presence of the 
minority group, as well as situations of direct 
competition and conflict of interest. Under 
various labels (including group-threat, group-
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competition, and group-conflict theory; here-
inafter, GTT), this combination of factors has 
inspired legions of scholars. Although the 
“overreliance on the tradition of competitive 
threat” eventually “stunted the growth of al-
ternative explanations” (Ceobanu and Es-
candell, 2010: 310), much valuable know-
ledge on individual and country-level 
predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment was 
generated. Available research (e.g. Ceobanu 
and Escandell, 2010: 318-322; Semyonov et 
al., 2006: 427-430; Wilkes et al., 2008: 304-
307) shows that perceptions of group-threat 
and ensuing manifestations of prejudice tend 
to be more common among people with low 
educational attainment, low-skill employ-
ment, right-wing ideology, and the unem-
ployed. While “sociotropic concerns” (Sides 
and Citrin, 2007) mostly outweigh personal 
vulnerabilities, patterns of individual suscep-
tibility were found to be reinforced amidst 
heightened objective threats, as predicated 
by out-group size and economic conditions 
(Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002). A 
growing number of longitudinal studies 
(Coenders et al., 2005; Davidov and Meule-
man, 2012; Hopkins, 2010; Lancee and Par-
dos-Prado, 2013; Meuleman et al., 2009; Se-
myonov et al., 2006; Wilkes et al., 2008) add 
weight to these findings. Existing evidence is 
predominantly regarded to support GTT; yet 
“the state of the economy appears to be a 
stronger predictor of ATII than immigrant con-
centration” (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 
322). However, some studies question if prej-
udice is indeed driven by objective conditions 
(Sides and Citrin, 2007), drawing attention to 
the relevance of perceptions regarding out-
group size (Semyonov et al., 2004) and eco-
nomic conditions (Billiet, Meuleman and De 
Witte, 2014; Kunovich, 2004).
To summarise, there are two problems 
with the current state of ATII research: GTT 
has degenerated into a “ready-for-use” com-
modity, and the clarity that characterised All-
port’s thinking on group-conflict and preju-
dice has diminished alarmingly2. Allport 
(1954: 233) acknowledged the difficulty in 
discerning “the pure tone” of realistic conflict 
from the “surrounding jangle” of related prej-
udice; however, the conceptual distinction 
between clashes of interest and gratuitous 
animosity was clear-cut. Allport stressed that 
conflicts of interest are not, as such, mani-
festations of prejudice; instead, he thought of 
prejudice as “excess baggage” that “cloud-
ed” any real issues. In contrast, the possibility 
of conceiving real issues as such has disap-
peared conceptually from many contempo-
rary ATII studies. 
This critique of established scholarship 
has practical implications: misgivings con-
cerning immigration’s effects must not be 
equated with anti-immigrant sentiment, or 
even racism. The need for specific concep-
tualisation and measurement is illustrated in 
the next section: in Andalusia, animosity re-
mained stable, it even receded, in a context 
of intensifying notions of conflict of interest. 
This puzzling attitude pattern would go un-
detected if perceptions of economic group-
threat were equated with enmity. 
andalusIa’s “Intergroup 
paradox”: dIvergent tIme-trends 
Among the European countries afflicted by 
the multi-faceted crisis that started in 2008, 
it is well-known that Spain has undergone a 
particularly harsh deterioration of its labour-
market. Internationally less known is the fact 
that in some parts of Spain the crisis struck 
even more severely. Andalusia’s unemploy-
ment rate exceeded 35% in 2013 – 20 points 
more than in 2008, about 10 points above the 
Spanish national average, and three times 
2 A noteworthy exception is the resurgent interest in 
person-positivity-bias (Iyengar et al., 2013), a line of re-
search that distinguishes individual-level attitudes from 
group-level attitudes.  
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the EU average3. While these figures under-
report shadow employment, they are plainly 
unsustainable. The region’s size and location 
enhance its interest as a case study: at 8.4 
million, Andalusia’s population exceeds that 
of half the EU member states; a maritime 
Schengen border, it faces structural immigra-
tion pressure.  
The crisis reversed an economic boom at 
the height of which Spain’s labour market in-
corporated half a million foreign workers an-
nually (Aja et al., 2009). Andalusia attracted 
immigrants from Africa (mainly Morocco), 
Latin America, and Eastern Europe (mostly 
Romania), most of whom worked in agricul-
ture, domestic services, catering, and the 
then-bristling construction industry. Within a 
decade, Andalusia’s foreign population quad-
rupled to 8.7% (around 20% in Almeria and 
Malaga provinces) (OPAM, 2013a). Immigra-
tion from less-developed countries continued 
to grow until 2010, and then stabilised at 
around 5.5% of registered inhabitants.
According to GTT, such a sequence of 
intense immigration and surging unemploy-
ment is prone to trigger intergroup tensions. 
A third of Andalusia’s adult population have 
not completed secondary education, and 
12.5% of Spanish-national employees per-
form unskilled work—circumstances that 
might foster perceptions of competition for 
low-status employment (Mayda, 2006). Con-
ditions in 2013 differed sharply from the 
1990s, when any notion of group-threat 
seemed “to be constructed rather than actu-
ally experienced” (Escandell and Ceobanu, 
2009: 66). 
Perceptions of economic group-threat 
evolved roughly in parallel with unemploy-
ment rates, according to the OPIA survey 
(“Opiniones y actitudes de la población anda-
luza ante la inmigración”), which explores the 
opinions and attitudes of Andalusia’s Span-
3 Employment data obtained from the Spanish Labour 
Force Survey (www.ine.es).
ish-national residents specifically towards 
immigration from less-developed countries 
(comprising Romania and Bulgaria)4. As 
could be expected, the perceived usefulness 
of immigrant workers was hampered by the 
crisis (table I, item a). When asked about im-
migration’s downsides, in 2013 a majority of 
natives spontaneously mentioned the labour-
market; in 2008, only a minority had done so. 
Perceived drawbacks were mostly associat-
ed with immigrants from less-developed 
countries in general, rather than specific sub-
groups. Since economic benefits had previ-
ously been seen as immigration’s main up-
side, the crisis caused overall impact 
assessments to deteriorate sharply: in 2013, 
two-thirds of Andalusians voiced unfavour-
able views (item b). 
Many scholars would interpret such data 
as evidence of mounting hostility against 
people of foreign origin (see section 1); how-
ever, specific measurement suggests other-
wise. Amidst the worst economic crisis in 
decades, few Andalusians expressed antipa-
thy towards immigrants (item c); actually, af-
ter increasing slightly (2008-2011), manifest 
aversion receded. Other indicators of anti-
immigrant acrimony (including generalised 
distrust or the explicit rejection of immigrant 
neighbours: items d and e) also showed low 
prevalence and inverse-U evolution. Available 
data imply that immigrants have not been 
converted into scapegoats for economic mis-
fortunes; declining issue salience (item f) con-
veys the same conclusion. This is particularly 
remarkable, since mistrust of specific immi-
grant groups remains widespread (item g); 
4 From 2005 through 2013, the Institute for Advanced 
Social Studies (IESA-CSIC) carried out five editions of 
OPIA on behalf of Andalusia’s Migration Observatory 
(OPAM, “Observatorio Permanente Andaluz de las 
Migraciones”); since 2008, the whole region has been 
covered and since 2010 the survey has combined land-
line and mobile users. Original samples ranged from 
2,402 (2013) to 4,120 (2008) CATI interviews, with 
margins of sampling error at around 2%; samples used 
here (see table I) exclude foreign-born Spaniards.  
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Moroccans and Romanian Gypsies stand out 
for their “bad image”. Such ample diffusion of 
negative stereotypes suggests that specific 
populations might bear the brunt if intergroup 
relations were to deteriorate; qualitative evi-
dence also alerts to that risk. 
Why did such deterioration not occur de-
spite a protracted economic downturn? The 
conflations that characterise much current 
scholarship would make that riddle invisible. 
Andalusia’s combination of dismal labour-
market performance and diverging attitude 
trajectories constitutes a strategic research 
site which “effectively exhibit(s) the structure 
and workings of the phenomen(on) to be un-
derstood” (Merton, 1987: 11).
the contaInment of antI-
ImmIgrant sentIment In tImes of 
crIsIs
The first two sections of this paper resulted 
in a certainty and a query. The certainty is 
that the advancement of ATII research re-
quires side-stepping the conflation of per-
ceived group-conflict with xenophobic hos-
tility. The ensuing query concerns the reasons 
for anti-immigrant sentiment (strictly speak-
ing) to remain subdued amidst calamitous 
economic context. This riddle is concerned 
with sentiment towards groups, rather than 
specific individuals (Iyengar et al., 2013). 
However, it is not an entirely abstract attitude 
either, as it refers to groups of persons. Sen-
timent towards immigrants is located at the 
interface between “intergroup” and “interper-
sonal” relations. 
Following Allport’s (1954: 9) definition of 
prejudice as generalised antipathy towards a 
social group and its members (a core defini-
tion accepted even by otherwise feuding con-
temporary scholars, e.g. Pettigrew and 
Meertens, 1995; Coenders et al., 2001), this 
study focuses on manifest antipathy toward 
immigrants as explanandum. I assume ex-
plicit antipathy to differ qualitatively from oth-
er sentiments, whatever their exact nature. 
Explanatory hypotheses 
To identify a wide range of possible explana-
tions, I rely on prior ATII scholarship and 
knowledge about national and regional-level 
institutions and policies (see Ceobanu and 
TablE 1. Evolution of various ATII facets (Andalusia, 2008-2013) 
2008 
%
2010 
%
2011 
%
2013 
%
2008-2013 
difference  
(p.p.)
(a) Labour-market mentioned spontaneously as negative as-
pect of immigration 
31.4 45.7 48.7 52.4 21.0**
(b) Immigration’s impact perceived as ‘rather’ or ‘very’ negative 37.1 54.7 58.2 64.2 27.1**
(c) Manifest antipathy (‘never’ or ‘hardly ever’ felt sympathy for 
immigrants)
14.3 15.8 16.1 11.0 -3.3**
(d) ‘No trust at all’ in immigrants 9.4 11.6 12.1 8.5 -0.9
(e) Prefers living where ‘almost nobody’ was immigrant -- 18.5 20.4 16.5 --
(f) Salience of immigration as a social issue 10.9 6.5 5.7 0.9 -10.0**
(g) Mistrust toward specific immigrant groups 53.2 48.8 52.1 52.0 -1.2
Notes: Andalusia’s Spanish-national residents (including double nationality), ages 18+, were surveyed. See Appendix for 
questionnaire wording. All data rounded. **Significant at 1% (p<0.01).
Source: OPAM, OPIA survey (waves II-V). Fieldwork timing and sample sizes (excluding interviewees born outside Spain): 
February 2008, N=4,065; February 2010, N=3,125; January-February 2011, N=2,375; April-May 2013, N=2,363.
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Escandell, 2010; Hjerm, 2007; Zamora-Ka-
poor, 2013; Rinken, 2015). Two groups of 
factors are discerned: general predisposi-
tions versus situational perceptions (see Sni-
derman et al., 2004). The first category com-
prises normative and cognitive mindsets 
concerning the nature and extent of group 
membership; the overarching idea here is 
that more encompassing membership con-
ceptions might counteract the impact of eco-
nomic adversity on sentiment towards immi-
grants. In contrast to such principled views, 
the second category comprises rather vola-
tile perceptions of the crisis, its origin, and its 
repercussions; situational factors are sup-
posed to influence current intergroup rela-
tions without altering the underlying in-group/
out-group dichotomy as such. In the follow-
ing sections, I will develop five dispositional 
and four situational hypotheses.
Normative and cognitive predispositions
The prevalence of unfavourable ATII is known 
to vary across population segments: traits 
such as being young, well-educated, eco-
nomically well-to-do, or politically left-lean-
ing, predict more benevolent views. Among 
these features, ideology stands out as a 
plausible explanation for benign attitudes de-
spite Andalusia’s labour-market being in the 
doldrums: ideological predispositions oper-
ate as “judgmental shortcuts” (Sniderman et 
al., 1991) that frame manifold issues, and the 
region’s political centre of gravity is mark-
edly left-of-centre.  
Contact theory offers another well-estab-
lished and intuitively compelling explanation. 
Considering ignorance to cause prejudice, it 
assumes personal contact with immigrants, 
especially horizontal and close relationships 
(Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Schlueter and 
Wagner, 2008), to re-define the in-group. 
Just as contact diminishes prejudice, preju-
diced natives tend to avoid immigrants (cf. 
Pettigrew, 1998): regardless of the economic 
context, an inverse correlation of contact and 
animosity can be expected. 
Interest-based explanations of hostility 
are routinely contrasted with explanations 
concerning cultural diversity (e.g. Hainmuel-
ler and Hiscox, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007); 
peaceful intergroup relationships despite the 
economic crisis might therefore be attributed 
to pro-diversity views. Strong formulations of 
this hypothesis (Schlueter et al., 2013) pre-
dict time-lagged out-group hostility to be 
minor where policies had been more immi-
grant-friendly. Spain pursued comparatively 
lenient policies regarding immigrants’ access 
to employment and public services (Bruque-
tas-Callejo et al. 2011; Cebolla-Boado and 
González-Ferrer, 2008; Laparra, 2011); and 
Andalusia’s regional government sought a 
high profile in immigrant integration and in-
tercultural openness (Martínez de Lizarron-
do-Artola, 2009; Pérez-Yruela and Rinken, 
2005). However, this domain is ambivalent: 
visible diversity-promotion receded as the 
crisis unfolded; negative stereotype re-
mained widespread (table I, item g); and im-
migrant workers have reportedly suffered 
“racialised marginalisation” (Calavita, 2005). 
In 2000, Spain’s markedly Universalist 
political culture was extended to immigration 
policy (Arango, 2013). Municipal population 
registries became the “true centrepiece of 
Spain’s model of immigration management 
and immigrant integration” (Cebolla-Boado 
and González-Ferrer, 2013: 162): access to 
ample civic and social rights was legally 
framed in terms of de facto residence, to the 
detriment of contending criteria such as na-
tionality and administrative status. In line with 
the “social learning” paradigm, such policies 
might have contributed to containing anti-
immigrant hostility: for practical purposes, all 
inhabitants would be seen to constitute es-
sentially one group. 
Spain’s history might also have fostered 
a distinctive inclination to dissimulate hostile 
attitudes toward foreign-born people: the 
democratic transition forged a political cul-
ture that dismisses any views associated 
with Franco-era nationalism as being reac-
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tionary. If measurement were distorted by 
desirability bias (Phillips and Clancy, 1972), 
natives’ real sentiment would be less benev-
olent than stated in surveys. The disposition 
at stake here is eminently normative: it pre-
supposed that people care to conceal ad-
verse sentiment.
Perceptions of intergroup dynamics 
GTT associates large and/or growing immi-
grant populations with intergroup tensions; 
therefore, decreasing populations should 
reduce animosity. Regarding Andalusia, 
Zamora-Kapoor (2013: 94) suggested that 
“the devastating effects of the current eco-
nomic crisis have motivated out-migration 
flows, and these, in turn, have de-problem-
atized immigration”. Akin to a safety valve, 
out-migration supposedly neutralises the 
unfavourable impact of economic adversity. 
Hence, if context conditions were to dete-
riorate further, re-emigration should accel-
erate, additionally fostering immigration’s 
de-problematisation: a virtuous circle of 
sorts. Yet, “it is not the actual (out-group) 
size per se that prompts anti-foreigners 
sentiments but it is the socio-psychological 
construct—perceived size of the out-group 
population that is associated with anti-for-
eigners sentiments” (Semyonov et al., 2004: 
696; my emphasis). Scholars have routinely 
used natives’ (often exaggerated) estimates 
of immigrant populations to predict enmity; 
the same emphasis on perceptions should 
apply when addressing hostility-contain-
ment. 
Zamora-Kapoor (2013: 98) noted that re-
emigration is driven by immigrants’ precarious 
employment profiles and disproportionate job 
losses; however, she did not dwell on the con-
ceptual implications of this observation (see 
Rinken, 2015: 66). To explain less prejudice 
among disadvantaged segments of economi-
cally strained immigration societies, Kunovich 
(2004: 25; 39-40) drew on group-position 
theory (Blumer, 1958) when venturing that, 
“Immigrants may be less threatening to disadvan-
taged groups if immigrants are disproportionately 
affected by economic downturns. (…) With worse-
ning economic conditions, immigrants may fall 
further behind native workers, which could de-
crease the threat posed by immigrants and, thus, 
reduce negative attitudes toward them.”
The ensuing “status-trajectories” hypoth-
esis—which again, should refer primarily to 
perceptions—transcends the socio-structur-
al dichotomy examined by Kunovich. As All-
port suggested, prejudiced personalities will 
be more numerous in times and places where 
“vertical mobility brings both incentive and 
alarm to members of society” (1954: 223). A 
“reverse-gear” version of this line of thinking 
predicts less animosity when immigrants are 
seen to suffer strong downward mobility. 
Similar reasoning applies to government 
policy. Since “countries are responsible for 
creating and maintaining citizenship bounda-
ries that identify to whom various rights and 
obligations are extended” (Kunovich, 2004: 
41), backlash may arise if natives were to 
perceive citizenship boundaries as exces-
sively nebulous; yet, anti-immigrant enmity 
should ease if the government were seen to 
impose pronounced setbacks on non-citi-
zens. The latter perception might plausibly 
have been triggered when, in 2012, Spain’s 
centre-right government restricted irregular 
migrants’ previously unlimited access to 
public health-care. This measure’s symbol-
ism might have extended to Andalusia as 
well, although the region’s Socialist govern-
ment refused to implement the restrictions. 
Kunovich (2004) proposed yet another 
explication of receding anti-immigrant en-
mity in disadvantaged populations, suggest-
ing such patterns might be due to anger be-
ing directed toward politicians, rather than 
immigrants. Again, this hypothesis is empiri-
cally plausible: both in Andalusia and across 
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Spain5, the political class emerged as a 
prominent social concern when protracted 
unemployment and austerity policies began 
to dent many Spaniards’ living standards; 
disaffection was also spurred by corruption 
scandals. 
Model design and measurement 
This study relies on cross-sectional data6 for 
hypothesis-testing; all predictions thus re-
gard the prevalence of anti-immigrant senti-
ment in distinct segments of Andalusia’s 
population in 2013—the sixth year (and a 
posteriori, the nadir) of the labour-market 
downturn that had started in 2008. As far as 
general predispositions are concerned, anti-
immigrant sentiment is predicted to be less 
common among people who adhere to leftist 
ideology (H1), maintain close personal con-
tact with immigrants (H2), do not express 
worries about cultural diversity (H3), support 
immigrants’ equal access to opportunities 
and rights (H4), and are more inclined to con-
ceal prejudiced views (H5). Concerning ani-
mosity-easing perceptions, sentiment is pre-
dicted to be more benign among natives who 
expect the immigrant population to diminish 
substantially (H6), perceive immigrants’ so-
cial position to deteriorate markedly (H7), 
perceive the government to protect citizen-
ship boundaries adequately (H8), and blame 
elites for economic mismanagement and 
malaise (H9).
The first group of predictors refers to prin-
cipled views on encompassing group mem-
bership; such explanations may at first sight 
appear to be excessively conventional, even 
endogenous. However, bearing in mind the 
5 The Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (Centro 
de Investigaciones Sociológicas) provides monthly data 
on issue salience (www.cis.es). 
6 Largely identical questionnaires and sampling 
procedures were employed by the OPIA survey from 
2005 through 2013, but indicators for the conceptually 
intriguing exodus expectation and status trajectories 
hypotheses are available for 2013 only.
dramatic levels of unemployment, their ani-
mosity-reducing capacities cannot be taken 
for granted; for example, the impact of leftist 
ideology might fade during an economic cri-
sis (see Pardos-Prado, 2011). In addition to 
testing the enmity-containing properties of 
dispositional and situational factors in objec-
tively inauspicious circumstances, this study 
examines whether their impact is affected by 
subjective threat perceptions. 
Model design
A well-known procedure for analysing the 
conditional odds of events that differ qualita-
tively from non-events, binomial logistic re-
gression is especially appropriate for hypoth-
esis testing. As Mood (2010) stressed, such 
models’ effect estimates and their cross-
group comparisons may be distorted by un-
observed heterogeneity. However, such dis-
tortions underestimate predictor effects 
(Mood, 2010: 72); these are tested under 
more strenuous assumptions than in a ficti-
tious model that fully explained all variance. 
A binomial logistic regression model com-
pares social groups with a view to the likeli-
hood of the chosen event (manifest antipathy 
towards immigrants, in this study). One ex-
pression of each predictor variable was coded 
as reference category (hereinafter, RC); odds-
ratios (ORs) were computed for the remaining 
expressions of that variable. If the OR is close 
to par, the event’s likelihood does not vary sig-
nificantly across the specified groups; if it is 
below par, the comparison group is less likely 
to “score” an event than the RC; if the ratio 
exceeds par, that likelihood is higher. All other 
predictors are held constant: each predictor’s 
odds coefficient is computed regardless of 
other predictors’ values. When refining the 
model, the ORs of previously included predic-
tors remain stable unless their effect on the 
dependent was altered by any of the addi-
tional predictors. 
The model computed here relies on two 
fundamental decisions. Firstly, more animos-
ity-prone expressions of all predictor varia-
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bles were coded as RC; thus, ORs signifi-
cantly below par confirm stated hypotheses. 
Secondly, the basic socio-demographic 
model (M1) was extended with indicators of 
economic threat (M2), prior to adding indica-
tors concerning general predispositions (M3) 
and situational perceptions (M4), respective-
ly. Thus, apart from testing stated hypothe-
ses in an objectively inauspicious context, 
the model makes it possible to assess 
whether dispositional and situational factors 
reduce anti-immigrant animosity regardless 
of subjective perceptions of labour-market 
threat. 
Interaction terms (M5) further examine 
two hypotheses. Concerning pro-diversity 
views (H3), one generic and one group-spe-
cific predictor were estimated; their interac-
tion term captures consistent support for 
diversity. Similarly, exodus-expectations (H6) 
were supposed to be driven by perceived 
status losses (H7); the interaction term re-
veals how their combination affected senti-
ment towards immigrants.
Measurement  
OPIA’s 2013 dataset (see section 2) was 
used; to discard naturalised immigrants, for-
eign-born respondents were excluded 
(N=2,363). To maximise interpretative trans-
parency, the dependent was operationalised 
with a single item that captures the focal 
construct (explicit antipathy) quite literally: 
“how often have you felt sympathy for im-
migrants?” (table I, item c; see Appendix). 
Stating to have “never” or “hardly ever” felt 
sympathy for immigrants was coded as event 
(11% of cases qualify); all other answers 
were coded as non-event. 
Explanatory hypotheses were operation-
alised as follows (see Appendix for details). 
Regarding H1, apart from three conventional 
groupings (left-of-centre; centre; right-of-
centre), respondents unable or unwilling to 
self-rate their ideology (approximately one-
fourth of the sample) were retained as a cat-
egory. H2 was measured as counting immi-
grants among one’s friends and/or relatives 
(37% of natives did). H3 was tested with two 
items: generic support for immigrants main-
taining their traditions (39.8% approved), and 
absence of group-specific mistrust (44.4%). 
H4 was gauged by support for immigrants’ 
full social participation (75% of natives ap-
proved). Educational attainment (three cate-
gories) served as rough proxy for assessing 
H5, on the assumption that the better-edu-
cated are more aware of social norms and 
better able to dissimulate prejudice; yet since 
education might also improve sincere senti-
ment, this indicator allows the rejection, but 
not the confirmation of H5. H6 was captured 
by the idea that economic stagnation would 
induce “a majority” of immigrants to leave 
(81.2% agree); as for H7, 56.9% agreed that 
immigrants are “one of the social groups 
most badly affected by the crisis”. Perceived 
dilution of citizenship boundaries was 
gauged as affirming that immigrants received 
“some” or “much” government protection, 
while not considering them a priority to that 
effect; almost 40% of natives stated this 
combination of views (H8). Elite-bashing (H9) 
was measured as mentioning politicians and/
or corruption as outstanding social problem 
(33.7%).
Results
Multivariate results (ORs) are shown in ta-
ble 27. Below-par ORs confirmed, while 
above-par values defied, our predictions of 
hostility-reducing capacities. 
Socio-demographic profile: M1 and M2 por-
tray men as being less prone to express an-
7 Bivariate correlations (p<0.01, two-tailed test) existed 
between most predictors and dependent, in the expected 
direction. However, concerning perceived status 
trajectories (H7), no significant correlation was found, 
and absence of group-specific stereotype correlated (if 
slightly) with antipathy, contradicting expectations (H3). 
Multivariate findings corroborated and refined these 
preliminary results.   
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TablE 2. Binomial logistic regression: manifest antipathy (Andalusia, 2013)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Correctly classified 89.0% 89.0% 89.3% 89.7% 89.7%
Goodness-of-fit (Nagelkerke) 8.6% 9.9% 20.8% 23.8% 25.1%
Constant 0.347**  (0.216)
0.431** 
(0.247)
0.744 
(0.277)
1.236 
(0.309)
0.904 
(0.326)
Socio-demographic profile
Gender: male 0.660** (0.139)
0.635** 
(0.140)
0.872 
(0.149)
1.018 
(0.152)
1.045 
(0.159)
Age-group: 18-34 years 1.332  (0.178) 
1.262  
(0.187)
1.775** 
(0.200)
1.488 
(0.208)
1.541* 
(0.211)
Age-group: 35-49 years 0.971  (0.181) 
0.992  
(0.191)
1.247 
(0.200)
1.132 
(0.206)
1.228 
(0.209)
Educational attainment: secondary 0.554** (0.157)
0.566** 
(0.177)
0.563** 
(0.165)
0.634** 
(0.169)
0.629** 
(0.172)
Educational attainment: tertiary 0.196** (0.319)
0.212** 
(0.320)
0.224** 
(0.329)
0.300** 
(0.337)
0.299** 
(0.339)
Ideology: centre 0.512** (0.199) 
0.525** 
(0.199)
0.672 
(0.208)
0.678 
(0.211)
0.671 
(0.215)
Ideology: left-of-centre 0.419** (0.221) 
0.427** 
(0.222)
0.553* 
(0.232)
0.575* 
(0.236)
0.544* 
(0.241)
Ideology: not declared 0.923  (0.190)  
0.912  
(0.191)
1.114 
(0.202)
1.111 
(0.205)
1.049 
(0.209)
Habitat: low immigrant presence 1.122  (0.151)
1.065  
(0.152)
0.952 
(0.159)
0.958 
(0.164)
0.999 
(0.164)
Social class: middle to upper 0.788  (0.137)
0.806  
(0.139)
0.745* 
(0.146)
0.754 
(0.120)
0.755 
(0.151)
Perceived economic threat (inverse)
No ego-tropic threat 1.087  (0.148)
1.161 
(0.159)
1.258 
(0.159)
1.254  
(0.161)
No socio-tropic threat 0.562** (0.144)
0.583** 
(0.150)
0.572** 
(0.154)
0.594** 
(0.155)
Predispositions (other than ideology & educational at-
tainment)
Contact 0.260** (0.202)
0.277** 
(0.203)
0.258** 
(0.206)
Pro-diversity (generic) 0.802 (0.169)
0.749 
(0.172)
1.440 
(0.226)
Pro-diversity (specific) 1.549** (0.147)
1.431* 
(0.150)
2.094** 
(0.177)
Universalism 0.308** (0.155)
0.314** 
(0.159)
0.315** 
(0.160)
Perceptions of intergroup dynamics
Exodus expectation 0.584** (0.166)
0.649 
(0.239)
Status trajectories 1.485* (0.155)
1.636 
(0.293)
Citizenship boundaries 0.665** (0.152)
0.683* 
(0.153)
Elite-bashing  0.446** (0.194)
0.438** 
(0.195)
Interaction terms
Exodus expectation*Status trajectories 0.895 (0.337)
Pro-diversity (generic)*
Pro-diversity (specific)
0.266** 
(0.327)
Notes: Andalusia’s Spanish-national residents, including double nationality, ages 18+, were surveyed. See Appendix for 
question wording, coding, and reference categories. *Significant at 5% (p<0.05); **Significant at 1% (p<0.01). Squared error 
in brackets.
Source: OPAM, OPIA survey (wave V); N=2,363 (excluding foreign-born interviewees). 
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tipathy than women (M2, OR=0.635**); this 
effect ceases in M3, implying that immigra-
tion-friendly predispositions were more com-
mon among men. For analogous reasons, 
when holding predispositions constant, 
young people (18-34 years) were clearly 
more animosity-prone (M3, OR=1.755**) than 
their peers in the 50+ age-group (RC), a re-
sult that alerts to a hardening of sentiment 
among some native youths. Contrasting ex-
tant research (Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 
2013; Valdez, 2014), self-declared social 
class exerted little impact; and interestingly, 
the share of immigrants in the interviewees’ 
neighbourhood had no discernible effect. H1 
was confirmed: left-of-centre ideology re-
duced manifest animosity, especially before 
taking other predispositions into account 
(M2, OR=0.427**). Centrist views had a simi-
lar, yet less-pronounced effect; however, re-
spondents who declined to self-rate their 
ideology were just as animosity-prone as 
overt right-wingers (RC). As expected, better 
(especially university-level) educational at-
tainment reduced explicit antipathy; this ef-
fect remained fully intact when controlling for 
predispositions (M3, OR=0.224**), and de-
clined only slightly when also controlling for 
situational perceptions (M4, OR=0.300**). 
Hence, H5 was not rejected; still, the better-
educated may be sincerely more benevolent.
Perceptions of economic threat: Contradict-
ing extant studies (e.g. Lancee and Pardos-
Prado, 2013), and despite severe labour-
market downturn, absence of ego-tropic 
threat did not reduce the odds of animosity 
significantly; actually, albeit short of custom-
ary significance thresholds, the inverse 
seemed to apply when holding dispositional 
and situational factors constant (M4, 
OR=1.258). In contrast, GTT was vindicated 
in that anti-immigrant sentiment diminished 
consistently when no socio-tropic threat was 
voiced. Note that this predictor’s effect was 
stable when controlling for dispositional and 
situational factors (M2, OR=0.562**; M4, 
OR=0.572**). 
Predispositions (other than ideology and ed-
ucational attainment): Confirming H2 and H4, 
close contact (M3, OR=0.260**) and Univer-
salist views (M3, OR=0.308**) clearly reduced 
anti-immigrant animosity; both effects per-
sisted fully when situational factors were 
added (M4). Concerning H3, important qual-
ifications emerged: generic pro-diversity 
views failed to significantly reduce, and ab-
sence of group-specific mistrust even in-
creased, animosity (M3, OR=1.549**). Anti-
immigrant sentiment receded strongly when 
pro-diversity views were voiced on both 
counts (M5, OR=0.266**); yet among those 
lacking such coherent convictions, anti-im-
migrant antipathy increased when reticence 
toward specific groups was not articulated 
(M5, OR=2.094**), as compared to when it 
was (RC). This suggests that group-specific 
mistrust did not impede sympathetic, or at 
least neutral, sentiment toward immigrants in 
general; however, the reverse assessment 
seems just as appropriate. 
Perceptions of intergroup dynamics: Hypoth-
eses regarding exodus expectations (M4, 
OR=0.584**), citizenship boundaries (M4, 
OR=0.665**), and elite-bashing (M4, 
OR=0.446**) were confirmed. However, pre-
dictions concerning group-status trajectories 
(H7) were rejected: animosity increased when 
immigrants were perceived as badly affected 
by the crisis (M4; OR=1.485*), and was rough-
ly as common among natives who considered 
immigrants to be crisis-losers and bound to 
re-emigrate (M5, OR=0.895), as those taking 
the opposite view on both counts (M5, RC). 
Startlingly, two factors (H6 and H7) that were 
supposed to be intimately related instead 
proved to contradict, indeed neutralise, one 
another. Apart from a need for refining group-
position theory (see below), these results im-
ply that rather than deriving from perceived 
status trajectories, exodus expectations might 
basically represent a schematic reversal of the 
idea that expanding economies require immi-
grant labour—a ubiquitous notion throughout 
the boom that preceded the crisis. 
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dIscussIon 
The empirical evidence presented in this pa-
per is limited in various ways. The focal con-
struct, the explicit manifestation of anti-im-
migrant sentiment, was measured as a 
single-item dichotomised variable; while jus-
tified in terms of interpretative transparency, 
this choice leaves scope for alternative op-
tions. To maximise the range of testable pre-
dictors regarding sentiment toward immi-
grants amidst extraordinarily bleak economic 
context, a cross-sectional model was com-
puted; future inquiries should exploit multi-
survey or panel datasets, where available, 
and perhaps also explore experimental de-
signs. And although its size, location, migra-
tion history, economic record, and attitude 
trajectories make Andalusia a compelling 
case-study, future research should address 
cross-territorial comparisons; Europe’s cri-
sis-stricken Southern periphery is an obvious 
priority.
Despite these limitations, this study adds 
significantly to extant knowledge on inter-
group relations in economically troubled 
times. Its conceptual and methodological 
starting point is the insight that expansive 
notions of prejudice entail an unacceptable 
loss of accuracy. When equating any misgiv-
ings about immigration with the denigration 
of Otherness, scholars may be adding insult 
to (perceived) injury; that risk is especially 
palpable during protracted economic down-
turns. From a dynamic perspective, the pa-
per shows that attitudes toward immigrants 
may evolve very differently from views con-
cerning the impact and management of inter-
national migration, and indeed, perceptions 
of economic group-threat. Focusing on a 
setting marked by record unemployment, 
this paper identifies two sets of factors that 
improve sentiment towards immigrants, re-
gardless of whether or not natives voice mis-
givings about immigration’s labour-market 
effects: general predispositions regarding the 
nature and extent of group membership, on 
one hand, and specific perceptions of cur-
rent intergroup dynamics, on the other. 
Nine explanatory hypotheses were tested, 
five of which refer to predispositions, and four 
to situational perceptions. One situational hy-
pothesis was rejected in intriguing ways: 
rather than receding, animosity was found to 
increase among natives who viewed immi-
grants as especially vulnerable to the crisis’ 
impact. On the assumption that natives per-
ceive the plight of immigrant workers as an 
ominous precedent for their own occupation-
al prospects, this finding adds an interesting 
nuance to group-position theory (Kunovich, 
2004): fear of status contagion appears to 
take priority over the relative comfort of im-
migrants’ unfavourable status trajectories. 
Future research should follow up on this inter-
pretation, which seems plausible in circum-
stances where unemployment and austerity 
policies exert downward pressure on salaries 
and work conditions. Also pinpointing future 
research needs, two dispositional hypothe-
ses were confirmed with qualifications only. 
Social desirability might distort verbalisations 
of anti-immigrant sentiment, although this 
study does not prove such bias, much less 
quantify its extent. And while coherent pro-
diversity views were found to reduce animos-
ity, a trade-off between generalised antipathy 
and mistrust towards specific immigrant 
groups emerged when such consistent con-
victions were absent. 
Six hypotheses, three of which refer to dis-
positional factors and the other three to situ-
ational factors, were unequivocally confirmed. 
Animosity was found to be less prevalent 
among natives who professed left-of-centre 
ideology, maintained close contact with im-
migrants, and supported universal access to 
social rights, as well as those who expected a 
majority of immigrants to re-emigrate, per-
ceived the government to protect citizenship 
boundaries, and blamed elites for economic 
malaise. These six factors reduced anti-immi-
grant sentiment, regardless of whether or not 
immigration was viewed as economically det-
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rimental—in a context where a third of the 
workforce was unemployed. In such inauspi-
cious circumstances, the hostility-appeasing 
role of benign predispositions cannot be taken 
for granted. This study’s results contradict the 
common expectation that economic down-
turns inevitably drive anti-immigrant senti-
ment to expand beyond ill-disposed core con-
stituencies. Instead, a spill-over in the 
opposite direction was observed: various situ-
ational perceptions were found to reduce anti-
immigrant sentiment when controlling both for 
perceived conflict-of-interest and an assort-
ment of general dispositions. Three immigra-
tion-friendly predispositions (left-of-centre 
ideology, close contact, and Universalism) 
fully preserved their animosity-reducing ca-
pacities regardless of how current events 
were conceived; and three situational factors 
(re-emigration expectations, citizenship 
boundaries, and elite-blaming) improved sen-
timent toward immigrants, regardless of 
whether or not natives shared such benign 
predispositions. What is more, both sets of 
factors were found to exert their impact re-
gardless of whether or not natives voiced 
qualms about the effect of immigration on the 
labour-market. Beyond the specifics of these 
six explanatory factors, the paper’s main find-
ing is that even in a highly inauspicious con-
text and despite widespread scepticism con-
cerning immigration’s cost-benefit balance, 
virulent anti-immigrant sentiment may be kept 
in check by a combination of predispositions 
and perceptions. 
In conclusion, this study highlights how 
sentiment towards immigrants in crisis-
stricken immigration societies hinges on a 
complex array of manifold dispositional and 
situational factors, as opposed to macro-
economic conditions and interests per se; 
any notion of straightforward economic de-
terminism is definitely rejected by these find-
ings. Group-threat theory is not proved 
wrong; rather, it proves woefully incomplete. 
This study shows that perceptions of eco-
nomic conflict of interest are just one among 
a range of features and issues that determine 
natives’ sentiment toward the foreign-born. 
A combination of benevolent predispositions 
nurtured by historical and cultural idiosyncra-
sies, on the one hand, and reassuring per-
ceptions regarding the predominant group-
status of natives, on the other, seems 
well-suited to account for natives’ rather be-
nign sentiment toward immigrants in a bleak 
economic context. 
However, complex causalities do not con-
vey immunity against anti-immigrant back-
lash. Universalist credentials may be put to a 
Litmus test when the “temporal illusion” (Free-
man, 1995) fades; expectations of massive 
re-emigration might prove unfounded and ex-
cessive levels of unemployment might persist; 
and if the dyna mics of political competition 
were to change, immigration might again 
emerge as a salient issue. Eventually, unre-
solved tensions are likely to surface between 
encompassing group-membership concep-
tions and the “we-versus-them” logic of rela-
tive group-status. In the face of such chal-
lenges, this study might inspire institutional 
actors aiming to safeguard social cohesion, 
and researchers ready to salvage the distinc-
tion between misgivings about international 
migration, on the one hand, and animosity 
toward immigrants, on the other.
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appendIx: QuestIonnaIre WordIng and codIng decIsIons
Abbreviations: explicit response categories (EC); additional coding categories (AC); doesn’t 
know/doesn’t answer (DK/DA); reference category for regression model (RC). Spanish ques-
tionnaire wording (OPAM 2013b, 160-170) can be tracked with position codes (e.g., P7).
Item trajectories (table I) 
(a): “As you know, there are immigrants from less developed countries living in Andalusia. (…) 
What negative effects does this type of immigration have for Andalusia, in your opinion?” (P7). 
Open question; multiple response. 
(b): “Generally speaking, do you think that immigration is very positive, rather positive, rather 
negative, or very negative for Andalusia?” (P9). AC: neither/nor, depends, DK/DA. 
(c): “How often have you felt sympathy for immigrants?” (P17). EC: many times, quite a few 
times, sometimes, hardly ever, never. AC: depends, DK/DA. 
(d): “In conclusion, when now thinking about immigrants in general, how much trust do you 
think they merit?” (P27). EC: a lot of trust, some trust, a little trust, no trust at all. AC: depends, 
DK/DA.
(e): “If you had to decide where to live, which of these three places would you choose?” (P20). 
EC: a place where almost nobody was immigrant, a place where some people were immi-
grants, a place where many people were immigrants. AC: don’t care, DK/DA.
(f): “In order of priority, which are the three most pressing problems for Andalusians, in your 
opinion?” (P1). Open response.
(g):  “Is there any particular group [of immigrants] which you trust less?” (P26_1). EC: yes, no. 
AC: DK/DA.
Model estimators (table II)
Dependent: item (c) (table I). Codification: “hardly ever’ + “never’ (event)/ rest.
Sociodemographic profile. Gender: male, female (RC). Age-group: 18-34, 35-49, 50+ years 
(RC). Educational attainment: primary or less (RC), secondary, university education. Ideology: 
left-of-centre (0-4), centre (5), right-of-centre (6-10) (RC), DK/DA. Habitat: share of immigrants 
in neighbourhood below/above (RC) regional average. Social class: self-classification as low 
or lower-middle (RC) vs. middle, upper-middle or upper class.
Economic threat perceptions. Egotropic: “Throughout the past five years, have you at some 
point found yourself (…) facing the threat of unemployment?’ (E7_1). EC: yes, no, DK/DA. 
Codification: no/ rest of options (RC). Sociotropic: item (a) (table I). Codification: mentioning 
labour market (RC)/ rest of sample.
Predispositions. Ideology: see “profile’.  Contact:  “What sort of relationship are you referring 
to? (P18_3_1_filtered). Multiple response. EC: friendship, work, family or partner, neighbour-
hood, buying in places with immigrant employees or owners. AC: other. Codification: friend-
ship and-or family/ rest of sample (RC). Pro-diversity (generic): “Please tell me whether you 
strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree (…): immigrants should be able to live 
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here according to their customs’  (P15_1). AC: depends, DK/DA. Codification: “strongly agree’ 
or “agree’/ rest (RC). Pro-diversity (specific): item (g) (table I). Codification: rest (RC)/ “no’. 
Universalism: “Immigrants should be able to fully participate in our society’ (P16_1). EC: 
strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. AC: neither/nor, depends, only those au-
thorised to live in Andalusia, DK/DA. Codification: (strongly) agree/ rest (RC). Desirability-bias: 
see “educational attainment’.  
Perceived intergroup dynamics. Exodus expectation: “When there is no economic growth, a 
majority of immigrants leave’ (P13_2_3). EC: agree, disagree. AC: neither/nor, depends, DK/DA. 
Codification: agree/ rest (RC). Status trajectories: “Immigrants are one of the social groups most 
badly affected by the crisis’ (P13_5). EC: agree, disagree. AC: neither/nor, depends, DK/DA. 
Codification: agree/ rest (RC). Citizenship boundaries: “Would you please tell me whether the 
following groups presently receive much, some, little or no protection from the government? … 
immigrants’ (P4_5). AC:  DK/DA. “And in your opinion, which [two] groups should be most 
protected by the State?’ (P5). EC: Older people, unemployed people, young people, middle 
class, immigrants. AC: all of them, DK/DA. Codification: “much’ or “some’ government protec-
tion for immigrants (P4_5) but immigrants not a priority (P5) (RC)/ rest of sample. Elite-bashing: 
item (f) (table I). Codification: reference to political class or corruption/ rest of sample (RC).

